It has been suggested that to hold to a greater good defense (GGD) in response to the problem of evil, one must hold to a consequentialist theory of ethics. If the GGD proponent is not committed to consequentialism and is committed to an alternative ethical theory, a divine command theory, for example, then the GGD proponent is guilty of an inconsistency within his or her system of beliefs. This is a shame. The GGD is eminently plausible. So, is this right? The following is an attempt to provide a way out for the GGD proponent. Roughly I shall argue first that the GGD proponent does not have to appeal to any causal thesis about the production of greater goods. Feinberg’s objection relies, in part, on taking “production” to mean cause and by removing references to causes in her defense, the GGD proponent can blunt the objection. I will suggest that causal-consequentialism, the thesis that actions are justified by their effects either lets in too many or too few consequences. Therefo...