In this paper I will argue that the apparently commonplace activity of referring to God depends on what we take to be the relationship between a given entity and the name of that entity. It is commonly held that reference depends on some definite description of the entity in question. I will argue that Saul Kripke’s criticisms of descriptivism are sufficient to reject the view. However, if we take Kripke’s causal theory or a Millian direct theory of reference we are confronted with the problem of worship. If people from a broad variety of religions can successfully refer to God, then can they be said to worship the same God? In the latter part of the paper I will propose a way to block this inference. There are several problems related to referring to God. Here are two: first, if we have no acquaintance with an entity can we refer to it successfully? Some believe that we experience God in something like a perceptual state. Perhaps we have a sixth sense in virtue of which we can c...